NOTICE: All information on these pages is your choice as
to response. Steve
Van Nattan is not any kind of an authority
on anything for anyone.
Caution, Playing the odds, and
The Nature of Small
REASONS TO NOT ACCEPT SMALL POX VACCINATION
odds of your getting small pox from a terrorist bio-attack grow smaller and smaller
as gullible people allow themselves to be vaccinated. Small pox, other than in
the area of terrorist release of the virus, will have to be transmitted from person
to person. After the majority of Americans are vaccinated, your chance of getting
the disease will be very slim. Let someone else take the risk of the vaccine and
reap the benefit.
is the medical and rational OTHER part of the story:
20 Reasons Not to Take Smallpox Vaccine
By Ingri Cassel,
1. George W. Bush has said of smallpox
vaccination: "One of my concerns
if we were to have universal vaccination,
some might lose their life."
~The Times (in London), November 09, 2001.
2. For each million people vaccinated with the smallpox vaccine, as
as 250 could die, according to the American Medical Association.
250 times 285 (millions of Americans) and the possible deaths from
universal smallpox vaccination could equal 71,250. ~ Journal of the
American Medical Association, June 9, 1999, Vol. 281, No. 22, p. 132.
[this is more than 71,000 people dead]
3. "The American Medical
Association said on Tuesday it was not in favor
of an immediate mass U.S.
smallpox vaccination program, saying the
potential threat of a bioterror attack
did not warrant inoculating every
American against the disease."
December 12, 2001.
4. "Right now the risk of getting the vaccine
is higher than the benefit.
You could get a secondary infection, a full-blown
~Marie Rau, Panhandle Health District nurse, quoted
Spokesman-Review, November 20, 2001.
5. CDC director
Jeffrey Koplan has admitted that universal smallpox
vaccination could unleash
a significant number of side-effects. He said
that because many parts
of our population do not have a "robust immune
system," a fair number of people
could have serious reactions. ~Koplan
speaking on the PBS special "Bioterror
Propaganda" aired by WETA, November
6. If the entire
nation were to receive a smallpox vaccine, several
thousand people would likely
develop encephalitis, an inflammation of the
brain. ~Washington Post,
Dec. 26, 2001.
7. Roger J. Pomerantz, chief of the
infectious disease department at
Thomas Jefferson University in Philadelphia,
said that doctors have no
idea what the smallpox vaccine might do to people
at the extremes of
life--less than 2 and older than 65. He said that
an even greater concern
would be its effect on people with weakened immune
systems from HIV
infection, chemotherapy or transplants. ~Washington
Post, Dec. 26,
8. "Researchers have been reluctant
to recommend a new vaccination
program which would use the smallpox vaccine
for the local population
because the vaccine can cause disease and death in
persons with inadequate
~Science, Vol. 277, July
18, 1997, pp. 312-13.
9. Routine smallpox vaccination in
the United States ended in 1972.
Officials are hesitant to resume the immunizations
because the vaccine is
the most reactive of all and has been linked to serious
including death. ~ Reuters, November 29, 2001.
10. Eight printed pages of medical studies documenting the many serious
side effects of smallpox vaccination can be obtained at
See "smallpox vaccine adverse
reactions 66-76." [Note: go to the home page
above and put "smallpox
vaccine adverse reaction" in the search engine.] Repercussions
serious brain and heart diseases, autism, abnormal chromosomal changes,
diabetes, various cancers and leukemias, plus demyelination of nerve
years after vaccination.
11. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that vaccination must not be forced
on persons whose physical condition would
make such vaccination "cruel and
inhuman." In other words, the state has no
right to command that an
individual sacrifice his life in the name of public
health. ~Jacobsen V.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
By the 1920s, several British medical researchers documented that
was not only more common among the VACCINATED, but that the DEATH
smallpox was actually higher among those who had been
indicates that the vaccine was ineffective and
predisposed vaccinated persons
to more lethal disease. ~Vaccination, Dr.
Viera Scheibner, Australia,
1993, pp. 205-220.
13. Getting a vaccination does not guarantee
immunity. ~CDC, January 28,
14. By 1987, scientific
evidence indicated that the World Health
Organization's 13-year global smallpox
vaccination campaign may have
awakened dormant HIV infection in many vaccines.
~Times (in London) May
15. Vaccines made from animal
substrate contain animal viruses that are
impossible to filter out.
By 1961, scientists discovered that animal
viruses in vaccines, including
smallpox, could act as a carcinogen when
given to mice in combination with
cancer-causing chemicals, even in
amounts too small to induce tumors alone.
They concluded that vaccine
viruses function as a catalyst for tumor production.
16. Some of the new smallpox vaccine
doses will be created with animal
substrate. Because the vaccine will
incorporate vaccinia, the cowpox
virus, many wonder about possible mad-cow
million doses of the new vaccine will be created
using a cell line dating
back to 1966 and cultured from the lung tissues of
an aborted human fetus.
~World Net Daily, December 4, 2001.
17. The new smallpox vaccine will be genetically engineered. Many
believe that genetically engineered vaccines may be responsible
for the global
epidemic of auto-immune disease and neurological
College of Rheumatology, annual meeting, Nov.
8-12, 1998. Merck's genetically
engineered hepatitis B vaccine,
Recombivax HB, is a classic example.
According to Dr. Bonnie Dunbar of
Baylor College of Medicine, many thousands
of reported adverse reactions
to the hepatitis B vaccine include: chronic
disorders, rheumatoid arthritis, lupus and MS-like disease.
Dr. Dunbar to Texas Dept. of Health, March 12, 1999.
Over 15,000 French citizens sued the French government to stop mandatory
hepatitis B injections for school children because of resulting
~Science, July 31, 1998.
Dr. John Classen has published
voluminous data showing that the hepatitis
B and other vaccines are closely
linked to the development of insulin
in Clinical Practice, October 22, 1997.
18. The British vaccine
manufacturer Medeva has a horrendous record of
contamination and blunders.
In 2000, the FDA found that Medeva was making
vaccines in conditions of filth,
resulting in contaminated products.
Medeva had been illegally using bovine
medium to culture its polio
vaccines, then lied about it. Medeva also used
the blood of a
Creutzfeldt-Jakob victim (mad cow) to manufacture 83,000 doses
vaccine used for (against?) Irish children. Nevertheless, the
the USA to accept Medeva's flu vaccine (Fluvirin) for the year
~London Observer series: October 20-26, 2000.
2001, the British socialized health care system was reported to be
in a state
of collapse, with many hospitals and labs operating in abysmal
Five thousand people die each year from infections contracted in
10,000 become deathly ill from such infections.
are barely adequate and said to be risking the
spread of mad cow disease.
Government ministers are reportedly trying to
hush up the scandal. www.itn.co.uk/Jan
06, 2001; The Sunday Times of
London, November 12, 2001.
The U.S. government apparently intends to conduct NO double blind
on the safety and efficacy of the new smallpox vaccine. It has
286 million doses, one for every man, woman and child in America
at a cost
of $428 million. At least half of this vaccine will be
Acambis PLC of great Britain.
Tip of the Week: Keep all vaccine needles
away from your body!
Diseases Associated with Biological Warfare
Robert Trupin, BS
willingness of terrorist groups to employ weapons against the United States was
alarmingly demonstrated by the World Trade Center bombing, in which the stated
goal of the terrorists was to maximize civilian casualties. But the use of conventional
weapons to terrorize a civilian population is not the only cause for concern.
Health professionals should be acquainted with diseases that lend themselves to
bioterrorism. The possibility of a biological attack against one or more American
cities is a major concern. Should such an attack occur, medical professionals
are the nation's first line of defense. The quickness with which they diagnose
and respond to a bioterrorist outbreak could decide whether or not the U.S. suffers
The two most threatening diseases associated with bioterrorism
are smallpox and anthrax. Despite widespread assurances that smallpox
is not longer a threat, there is overwhelming evidence that contaband samples
of the virus remain stored in several laboratories throughout the world. That
so little attention has been devoted to the possible emergence of a deliberately
induced smallpox epidemic is evidence of poor planning as well as governmental
The smallpox virus probably
existed since the infancy of the human species, but required the population density
that can be supported by agriculture to spread quickly. The first historical record
of smallpox infection occurred about 3000 years ago in Egypt. Since then massive
smallpox epidemics have swept across Asia and Europe killing and disfiguring hundreds
of millions. Its contagiousness and explosive infection rate allows the virus
to spread rapidly . Smallpox is unique to humans and is believed to have killed
more people than any other disease in recorded history.(1)
Egypt. The oldest
known case of smallpox was that of Pharaoh Ramses V of Egypt who died in the twelfth
century BC. His mummy reveals that the young king's face and torso were covered
with blisters characteristic of smallpox.(2)
Rome. In 165 A.D. the
Roman empire was devastated by a smallpox epidemic that raged for fifteen years
and killed tens of millions. Romans were completely vulnerable to smallpox, the
disease having suddenly emerged from the Asian continent. The decline in population
reduced the Roman army which replaced its losses with barbarians who had no particular
loyalty to Rome. Rome was never able to recover its former military prowess, and
was eventually over-run by barbarian armies.(3)
and Asia. The middle-ages saw devastating outbreaks of smallpox that killed
untold millions throughout Europe and Asia leaving many of the survivors immune.
It was not uncommon for victims of smallpox or some other plague to be catapulted
over the walls of a city under siege in an attempt to start an epidemic within
Mexico. Cortez and his conquistadors
invaded Mexico in 1518. The Aztecs had no immunity to a host of European diseases,
the worst being smallpox. By the time Cortez and a few hundred of his exhausted
warriors attacked Mexico City with its huge population, the defenders had been
decimated and demoralized by smallpox. The city fell, and Aztec civilization fell
It is estimated that smallpox, along with a number of lesser diseases, killed
56 million native Americans during the Spanish conquest of Mexico. The death toll
mounted as smallpox spread to other Indian nations, none of which had any resistance
to infection. Infected blankets from smallpox victims were presented to native
Americans as gifts during the westward expansion of the United States.
Smallpox eradication campaign. In 1952, after the
disease had killed about 300 million people in the twentieth century (5),
a campaign to eradicate smallpox was initiated by the World Health Organization.
The Smallpox Eradication Unit was led by Dr. Donald A. Henderson, a particularly
capable epidemiologist. The disease existed in thirty-three countries and was
killing more than two-million people per year. A program of mass inoculation was
instituted over a twenty year period. Eighty percent of the population was inoculated
in regions harboring the disease, and the number of new smallpox cases approached
Yugoslavia had one of the last serious epidemics in 1972. A Muslim pilgrim
returned from Mecca to his home in Kosovo carrying the deadly virus. No case had
occurred in Yugoslavia since 1930, and the entire population of Yugoslavia had
been routinely vaccinated for the past 50 years. The pilgrim himself was inoculated
just two months earlier. Yugoslavia had, at the time, eighteen million doses of
vaccine available to serve 21 million people. The World Health Organization of
the United Nations had millions more. Yugoslavia had an authoritarian government
under Tito which was capable of acting swiftly, and if need be, ruthlessly.
The pilgrim felt achy with flu-like symptoms shortly after his return from Mecca.
For over a week he had been exposing his family to infection. His first serious
symptom was hemorrhaging in the whites of his eyes, which darkened until they
were almost black. The development of lesions on his body did not immediately
alert anyone to the possibility of smallpox, since no case had occurred in Yugoslavia
for over forty
After the onset of severe hemorrhaging, the pilgrim
was rushed to a local hospital where he infected a nurse and eight other patients.
From the local hospital he was rushed to a hospital in Belgrade where he infected
twenty-eight more people including eight doctors and nurses. They in turn in infected
150 more. The disease was moving rapidly throughout Yugoslavia.
The army was
mobilized and martial law was declared. The borders were sealed and unauthorized
travel was forbidden. Hotels and apartment houses were requisitioned and used
to quarantine over ten thousand people. Within two weeks everyone in Yugoslavia
had been revaccinated. The number of newly infected individuals dropped with each
wave soon reaching zero.(6)
In early 1975 smallpox broke out in Bangladesh and swept through more than
five-hundred villages. Dr. Henderson and his team vaccinated people in rings around
each new outbreak, and tracked down everyone who had contact with infected individuals.
By the end of the year there were no new cases.(7)
The last known case in the world occurred in Somalia in 1977.(8)
is among the least pleasant diseases known to man.
It is an explosively contagious
viral infection that is unique to humans. It is classified as a hot agent in Biosafety
Level 4 category, which means that a single case, anywhere in the world, would
be considered a global medical emergency.(1) If smallpox infection is suspected,
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Emergency Response Office should be immediately
The Bioterrorism Emergency Number is (770) 488-7100.
Outbreak. In the
event of an outbreak of even a single case of smallpox, emergency powers are immediatelt
assumed by local, state, and federal authorities according to a chain of command
and division of responsibilities. CDC personnel will rush to the scene with protective
gear, vaccine, and whatever equipment is needed to collect samples. Specimen packaging
and transporting includes a documented chain of possession coordinated by the
FBI. Biosafety Level 4 disease specimens are rushed to CDC or several select Department
of Defense (DOD) laboratories.(9) Travel may be restricted
and quarantines imposed. Civil liberties and constitutional rights tend to fare
badly during national emergencies of this gravity.
outbreak. Smallpox epidemics develop in waves, with peaks and troughs separated
by two-week intervals that correspond to the average incubation period of the
virus. The virulence of the epidemic is a function of non-immune population density.
Immunized people stifle the epidemic by lowering the average number of transmissions
per infected individual. In an unvaccinated population, one infected person can
infect all non-immune people with whom he comes in contact. Immunized people in
an epidemic are analogous to control rods in nuclear reactors - they slow down
and stifle chain-reactions.
The U.S. Navy's Bioterrorism Task force specifies the use of masks, gowns,
gloves, with thorough washing after each exposure, and the isolation of smallpox
patients, preferably in negative pressure rooms. Face masks must be worn when
entering the patientís room. Airborne precautions should be followed. Smallpox
is transmitted by particles of five microns or less. They can remain suspended
near the patient, or move considerable distances in air currents.
precautions include use of clean gloves on entry into a patient's room, removing
gown before leaving room, washing hands and exposed surfaces with antimicrobial
soap, and air exchange every 6 to 12 hours through monitored high-efficiency filters.(10)
For prophylactic and
post-exposure immunization, smallpox vaccine should be administered to everyone
in contact with infected individuals. If more than three days have elapsed since
exposure, smallpox vaccine should be administered in conjunction with vaccinia-immune
globulin (VIG) ) (0.6l/kg 1M).(11)
course, assumes that such supplies exist).
Exposed individuals should be on
the alert for flue-like symptoms and rashes for 7 to 17 days after exposure. Isolating
smallpox patients, individually when possible or in groups when not possible,
Variola, the causative
agent in smallpox, is a large virus with a complex structure that belongs to a
class of pox viruses called Chordopoxviridae. It has a somewhat brick-like shape
with rounded corners and a knobby surface looking much like the surface of a hand-grenade.
(Figure 1) By dry weight variola contains 90% protein, 5% lipid, and 3.2% DNA.
Its double-stranded DNA consists of over 190,000 nucleotide base pairs built from
over 100 proteins. Its dimensions are about 250 x 250 x 200 nm, large enough to
be seen with an optical microscope.(12)gure
I: The variola virus
Variola replicates in the cytoplasm of the host cell independent
of the host cell enzymes. The virus rapidly multiplies until the cell bursts,
releasing tens of thousands of variolas capable of attacking other host cells.
The replication cycle is repeated every few hours and by the time the victim shows
symptoms, he is awash in quadrillions of variolas.
Confirmation of the presence of the variola virus is carried out by examination
of fluid from an active lesion. Active skin lesions are characterized by altered
epidermal cells containing eosinophilic intracytoplasmic bodies (Guarneri bodies).
Further confirmation is carried out using immunofluorescence and microscopy. The
distinctive shape and size of variola (it is the largest known virus) should make
a diagnosis definitive.
infection. To sustain
itself, the smallpox virus is passed from person to person in a continuing and
expanding chain of infection. It is spread primarily by the inhalation of airborne
droplets, and secondarily by physical contact. A single invisible droplet of exhalant
travels in still air about ten feet from its human source, and contains far more
viruses than is needed to infect a single individual.(13)
major. There are two variants of the smallpox virus: variola major
which is the more lethal variant, and variola minor which is a weak mutant.
We will only deal wih variola major. There is enough variation in the disease
progression that smallpox may not be recognized even by doctors familiar with
the disease of whom there are virtually none.
During a typical incubation period of ten to fifteen days the infected
person will feel normal, but is already contagious. The first signs of the onset
of the disease are severe flu-like symptoms, headache and fever. In another three
or four days, tiny red dots appear over the entire body. The spots develop, in
order of progression, from macules to papules to vesicles to pustules. An identifying
characteristic of smallpox is its foul and distinctive odor arising from the victim's
pustules, which once smelled is never forgotten.Pustules.
If the pustules merge to form a cont inuous surface encasing the entire
body, the disease is said to have split the skin, and the person will usually
die. The pustules can be so close together that the skin resembles a cobblestone
If the person survives, the blisters will turn into highly contagious
scabs which fall off the body, leaving the victim permanently scarred and in some
cases blind. The mortality rate is usually between twenty-five and fifty percent.
An epidemic in Canada in 1924 killed 50% of those stricken.(14)
There are two particularly deadly forms of smallpox - flat black
pox and hemorrhagic black pox:
black pox. In flat black pox the skin remains relatively smooth, but blackens
in large areas. The victim's immune system, having been paralyzed, produces no
pus. The blackened areas merge as hemorrhaging under the skin advances. The skin
sometimes detaches from the body and falls off in large sheets.
black pox. In the presence of hemorrhagic
black pox, highly contagious black, unclotted blood seeps from the victim's orifices.
The virus will sometimes break down the internal membranes which line the body's
organs. Pieces of membrane can be expelled through the victim's orifices accompanied
by a profusion of blood. The victim almost never survives this development.
pox. The disease most commonly confused with smallpox is chicken pox. During
the first two or three days after the rash has appeared, it may be difficult to
tell them apart. Chicken pox lesions are more superficial and variated than the
smallpox pustules which are dense and almost identical. Smallpox pustules tend
to be more numerous than chicken pox on the face and limbs. Chicken pox lesions,
unlike smallpox lesions, are very rarely found on the palms and soles.(15)
The Smallpox Vaccine
many of the proteins present in other pox viruses are similar to those found in
smallpox, it is possible to develop effective vaccines based on non-human pox
viruses (cow pox for instance). Other pox viruses that might grant immunity to
humans are monkey pox, orf in sheep, and molluscum contagiosum, a relatively mild
sexually transmitted disease in humans.
Smallpox vaccine is effective for
approximately ten years, after which it begins to lose potency. No one has been
vaccinated in the United States for the past twenty-five years. We are almost
as virgin a population as were the Aztecs when the conquistadors descended upon
The Centers for Disease Control owns a small supply of smallpox
vaccine that is stored in four cardboard boxes in the walk-in freezer of a pharmaceutical
company in Pennsylvania. The company, Wyet-Ayerst Laboratories, manufactured fifteen
million doses of smallpox vaccine over a period of five years some twenty-five
to thirty years ago.(16) The CDC
owns six to seven million doses of this production, a ridiculously insufficient
amount to protect a population the size of the US. But even this may be an inflated
figure and it has been reported that the vaccine has seriously deteriorated. Some
people on whom it was tested have had serious and even fatal reactions. The antidote
to these reactions has also deteriorated.(17) Such is our state of readiness.
When the World Health Organization declared total victory over smallpox in
1979 it had ten-million doses of smallpox vaccine in storage in Geneva, Switzerland.
The CDC then proceeded to deliberately destroy nine and one-half million of these
doses.(18) The people making this decision
had total confidence in the highly unlikely proposition that variola was completely
and permanently eradicated from the face of the earth. (Why, in that case, did
they not destroy all ten million doses of vaccine?)
This leaves one-half
million doses to deal with a global crisis, or one dose for every 12,000 people.
Smallpox vaccine is not difficult to produce. In the late eighteenth century
it was noticed by an English country doctor named Edward Jenner that dairy maids
who had contracted a mild disease called cowpox were never stricken with smallpox.
Using a drop of liquid from a cowpox blister, Dr. Jenner scratched it into the
arm of a young boy. Several months later he introduced deadly smallpox pus into
the boy's arm. The boy did not come down with the disease.(19)
Smallpox vaccine is almost 100% effective. Only three in one-million
doses produce adverse side-effects. The most frequent of these side-effects is
a condition called progressive vaccinia which affects immune-compromised people.
This condition, in which vaccinia grows at the vaccination cite, can be cured
with vaccinia immune globulin.(20)
The United States
does not manufacture smallpox vaccine in even limited quantities. This nation,
which managed to manufacture and distribute smallpox vaccine during the administration
of Thomas Jefferson, seems incapable of doing so today. Compared to other defense
and/or health systems, the cost of inoculating our entire population would be
trivial. If the U.S. began a crash program to manufacture the vaccine and inoculate
every person in the nation, it is estimated that it would take about 36 months
to complete the task.(21)
If we compare our readiness
with that of Yugoslavia in 1972 we might as well be a stone-age civilization.
Official indifference to the threat of smallpox could be rationalized if the virus
was known to be extinct. Unfortunately, the opposite is known to be the case.
Anti-terrorist experts are certain that the virus, though outlawed by the United
Nations, exists in a number of clandestine biowarfare laboratories located in
These include Russia, China,
North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. The United States keeps several vials of
live virus at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, hopefully under foolproof
security. The viruses are used to experiment with drugs that might be effective
against smallpox. So far none have been found.(23)
In 1995 the CIA gave a classified briefing to a number of public health officials
and biologists during which the list of possible variola sources was extended
to include Osama bin Ladden's Islamic terrorist organization, and Japan's Aum
Shinrikyo sect that was responsible for attacking subway commuters in Tokyo with
nerve gas.(24) Unlike nuclear weapons, the
virus could be surreptitiously introduced into a population without revealing
that a deliberate attack had occurred, or who had launched the attack.
In 1992 the leading Russian bioweapons expert and the inventor of the world's
most powerful anthrax virus, Dr. K. Alibekov, defected to the U.S. He revealed
that the Russian military has secretly stored at least twenty tons of the live
smallpox virus on various military bases throughout Russia. The intelligence community
has corroborated this information.(25)
leading Russian institute of virology, known as Vector, is situated outside Novosibersk
in Siberia. It is also a viral weapons development facility that contains living
variolas in a freezer.(26) Vector is underfunded and
is considered by the intelligence community to be a viral Chernobyl - an accident
waiting to happen. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, unpaid weaponry scientists
have been leaving rotting Soviet military facilities in droves, carrying their
expertise with them to unknown paymasters. There is no reason to believe that
some Vector scientists are not numbered among them. Nor do we have any assurance
that living variolas were not stolen amidst post-Soviet chaos.
principle biodefence laboratory is the United States Army Medical Institute of
Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, Maryland. The head of the laboratory, Dr.
Peter Jahring, recently said the following: "I don't think there is any higher
biological threat to this nation than smallpox... . If we have a bioterror emergency
with smallpox, there will be no time to start stroking our beards. We'd better
have vaccine pre-positioned on pallets and ready to go." (27)
In 1995 the National Security Council declared defense against
smallpox bioterrorism to be a top priority. The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), headed by Donna Shalala, was given responsibility for building
a stockpile of smallpox vaccine large enough to protect the United States. A controversial
study estimated the cost of producing 300,00 doses at seventy-five dollars per
dose and a delivery date in the year 2006.(28) It was
decided that the cost was prohibitive. (For several generations a much poorer
U.S. managed to inoculate everyone in the nation). The project was put on a back-burner,
from where it has apparently fallen off the stove.
General P. K. Russell MD, who headed the biohazard team that stopped an ebola
epidemic in 1989, blames our vulnerability to smallpox on "a lack of effective
leadership on the part of the government." D. A. Henderson said "The
effort at HHS still isn't organized."(29) The Department
of Health and Human Services is highly politicized even by Washington D.C. standards,
and has no history of assuming responsibility for any portion of national defense.
This makes the failure to build a smallpox vaccine stockpile even more incomprehensible,
since it does not entail the risk of handling live variolas.
lack of preparedness is not limited to smallpox. We cannot hope to be completely
protected from every possible mode of attack. There is always a period of vulnerability
between the introduction of a new attack weapon, and a defense against it. However
in the case of smallpox, vaccination predated the bioterrorist threat by more
than two centuries. There is no reason why we should remain vulnerable to this
August 1999 the new director of CDC in Atlanta, Jeffrey Koplan, decided to end
the bureaucratic stalemate concerning the production of smallpox vaccine. He called
a meeting of high officials in the relevant agencies (the Pentagon, the White
House, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Health and Human
Services) and announced that no one was allowed to leave the room untill a feasable
plan for manufacturing an adequate supply of vaccine in the shortest possible
time was instituted.
Dr. Koplan is one of the few doctors in the world with
experience in fighting smallpox. He had served on the medical team that successfully
stopped the world's last epidemic in Bangladesh in 1973. The CDC was given the
responsibility of creating the stockpile of smallpox vaccine with a target date
set for 2002.(30)
© 2000-2001 Robert Trupin. Reprinted with permission.
with links can be bought at Amazon.com
D. Smallpox: Clinical and Epidemiological Features CDC Vol.5, 08/99
2. Garret L.. The
Coming Plague Farrar, Straus, & Giroux; 1994.
3. Preston, Richard The New Yorker 7/12/99. Conde
4. O'Tool T. Smallpox: An Attack J. Hopkins
School of Public Health Vol 5, 1999
5. Bardi J. Aftermath of a
Hypothetical Smallpox Disaster J. Hopkins University; CDC:7/99.
6. Henderson D. Bioterrorism as a Public Threat. Emerging Infectious Diseases
CDC Vol 5 No.4. 1999.
7. McCade J. Addressing the Potential
Threat of Bioterrorism Emerging Infectious Diseases; CDC: Vol5 No.4. 1999.
8. English J, et al. Bioterrorism Readiness Plan:
A Template for Healthcare Facilities. Department of Navy: 4/13/99.
9. Preston R. The New Yorker. 1/10/00.
Aftermath of a Hypothetical Smallpox
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
day of the symposium featured a discussion of a scenario in which a medium-sized
American city is attacked with smallpox. Four panels represented various time
milestones after the attack, from a few weeks to several months. Panelists discussed
what they and their colleagues might be doing at each of these milestones. The
goal of the responses was to communicate the complexity of the issues and to explore
the diverse problems that might arise beyond the care and treatment of patients.
The scenario itself was a step-by-step account of a smallpox epidemic
in the fictional city of Northeast. Tara O'Toole, the scenario's lead author,
read the narrative account before each panel.
The panelists responded
to the events as if the epidemic were real and they were actually trying to identify,
contain, communicate, and otherwise deal with it. Panel members included experts
on hospital, city, state, federal, and media responses. Representing the hospitals
were John Bartlett and Trish Perl, Johns Hopkins Hospital; Julie Gerberding, Hospital
Infections Program, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and Gregory Moran,
Emergency Medicine, University of California at Los Angeles. Jerome Hauer represented
New York City's response. Representing the state were Michael Ascher, California
Department of Health Services Laboratory; Arne Carlson, former governor of Minnesota;
Terry O'Brien, a Minnesota State Assistant Attorney General; and Michael Osterholm,
Minnesota Department of Public Health. The federal representatives on the panels
were Robert Blitzer, former counterterrorism chief with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Robert DeMartino, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration;
Robert Knouss, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human
Services; and Scott Lillibridge, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Joanne
Rodgers, Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions Public Affairs, spoke to the response
of the media. George Strait, the medical news director for ABC News, acted as
moderator for each of the panels scheduled on day two. D.A. Henderson also helped
At the start of the epidemic, 2 weeks after the
bioterrorist attack, confusion reigns. There is uncertainty as to what the infection
is and reluctance to diagnose smallpox even when it is suspected. It is unclear
who is in charge of investigating and containing the epidemic. Outside, reporters
are knocking on the hospital doors. The question of what took so long to identify
the agent opens the panel. Smallpox, a nonspecific flulike illness, is hard to
diagnose, replies an emergency medicine physician. The disease is not suspected
because it was eradicated in the late 1970s. Any laboratory work on the first
cases would initially be testing for a battery of other causes, such as other
viral infections (e.g., monkeypox) or reactions to recent vaccinations. A window
of 2 weeks before positive identification of smallpox may even be optimistic.
The diagnosis would probably take much longer because of physicians' lack of familiarity
with the disease.
When all the tests for other infections turn up
negative and smallpox is strongly suspected, suggests a state laboratory chief,
a conclusive result from the laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) or the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) would still be needed. These are the only two places in the United
States equipped to identify smallpox virus in tissue samples. This part of the
diagnosis is fairly straightforward but it would take at least 1 day before the
definitive results could be obtained.
at the Hospital Level
Hospitals would probably isolate the
early cases presumptively, even if smallpox was not suspected, since the symptoms
would appear infectious. This is the opinion of a hospital infections expert.
In the city, argues a state health department professional, several hospitals
would each see one or two of the first few cases. The city health department would
quickly become aware of the similarity of the cases in the various hospitals,
recognize a potential outbreak (probably measles) and mobilize early to contain
Once smallpox is identified, the following organizations within
city government would be notified: the police department, the local emergency
management office, the city health commissioner's office, and, ultimately, the
mayor's office. This process may be difficult since it requires integrating the
health department into emergency management plans, an event with little precedent,
notes a city emergency official.
Who is in charge, agree panelists, is
one of the most important questions yearly in the epidemic, because any large-scale
relief effort would require good management. Complicating the answer, however,
are various levels of government, each with its own responsibilities and perspective
on response, as reflected in panelists' remarks.
Acts of domestic
terrorism are under the jurisdiction of the federal government, so several federal
agencies become involved, starting with FBI. FBI is involved from the very beginning
since any cases of smallpox would indicate a deliberate terrorist attack. A criminal
investigation begins immediately. CDC is involved as soon as samples are sent
for laboratory diagnosis.
The state government becomes involved at
the outset, since major threats to public health are dealt with on the state level.
The state health department starts its own investigation, and to reassure the
public, the governor may act as a spokesperson for the management of the epidemic.
The city is involved from the outset, explains the city emergency
management official, understanding that "bioterrorism is a local issue,"
which escalates very rapidly to state and federal levels. The local police and
emergency management teams, as well as the city health commissioner, the city
health department, and the mayor, are involved.
The problems of the
city become state problems immediately, counters the former governor, because
the news media treat any potential infectious disease outbreak as a regional problem.
This forces the governor's hand. The governor has to move in because there is
a need for one person to be in charge.
The most difficult situation
is how to deal with the hospital patients. One danger in the early days is losing
control of the crisis through panic. Once rumors about smallpox start to spread,
many workers within the hospital walk off the job. Understaffing also leads to
increased stress and confusion for patients and providers alike.
before federal and state command structures are in place, suggests a hospital
infections control expert, hospital epidemiologists would already be addressing
infection control issues. She notes that hospital infection control specialists
would be on the phone to colleagues in other city hospitals alerting one another.
Hospital epidemiologists, adds a state health official, would have a contact list
of state, local, and federal public-health authorities who also would be notified.
Another problem in coordination becomes clear to panelists: the difficulty
in sharing classified risk information among agencies and various levels of government.
Any early warning, which could have contributed to a more effective response,
was missing in the scenario. Even though the FBI had some early intelligence of
the attack, the alerting of health care workers was nonexistent. The problem lies
in the fact, assesses a state health department official, that health departments
have never been seen as intelligence communities, nor has there ever been a precedent
for passing such information to them.
On the federal level, CDC addresses
the public health issues of the epidemic, and FBI addresses the law enforcement
issues. These aims are not necessarily exclusive of one another, and the possibility
of linking efforts is raised. Everyone interviewed as a part of the epidemiologic
investigation may have to be interviewed as part of the criminal investigation
as well. Perhaps the most effective way to accomplish this is to conduct both
Some aspects of the two federal agencies
may overlap, perhaps even conflict, in agendas. Specimens that are sent to CDC
for positive identification of the smallpox virus may be needed by FBI as evidence
for any eventual prosecution. In many ways, it may appear as if FBI is running
the investigation. However, dealing with the sick, obtaining vaccine, and mobilizing
the epidemiologic investigation at the local, state, and federal levels are outside
the scope of FBI. CDC takes the lead on these public health issues, and together
with FBI, coordinates the management of federal resources.
who is coordinating activities at the hospitals is still unclear, and the question
of authority on that level is unresolved. Can outsiders come into a hospital and
wield power, and if so, who are they? Federal responders may have ambiguous authority
within a hospital and may add to the chaos. An FBI offical notes that his agency's
role in the hospitals will simply be to inform the doctors and administrators
of what the hospital needs to do to assist in the criminal investigationkeeping
evidence and coordinating interviews with patients. However, this may still leave
gaps of authority within the hospital.
In the scenario under consideration,
the state identifies one hospital as the smallpox hospital, and this also presents
a problem of coordination. The hospital itself has to work out the details of
local quarantine and the distribution of medicine to the patients, and there is
a need to protect the health-care workers and other hospital staff. Vaccine should
be immediately available to these workers, and its distribution will have to be
coordinated with CDC.
Outside the hospitals, an epidemiologic investigation
will be taking place that will need to be coordinated with CDC. A CDC official
points out the need for surveillance in the early days of the epidemic. To assist
in collecting data necessary to identify the release source and people at risk,
he recommends that CDC provide additional staff for much of the epidemiologic
work, including mid- and senior-level investigators. Bringing in these outside
experts should not represent a problem for local officials, he suggests, since
CDC already has strong ties with state epidemiologists.
How to control the message going to the public
weighs heavily upon the minds of all panelists. Reporters on the hospital scene
will quickly become aware of any rumors and will demand answers of any worker
or official who is handy. Official channels will not be the only source of information
during the epidemic, argues the public affairs specialist.
such as the police or fire officials, might show up with full biohazard protection;
such an image immediately raises questions. The media will digest information
from day one, whether or not there is an official statement from the city, state,
or federal level.
Controlling the message that goes out over the airwaves
could be extremely difficult, especially since there may not even be any consensus
on what the message should be in the first place. Several panelists point out
the need to ensure that information presented to the media is consistent and credible.
The city emergency manager suggests that the mayor will work with federal and
state officials to get consistent and credible information out to the public.
One viable alternative to speculation and misinformation, proposes an FBI official,
is to have a centralized joint information center, such as the one his agency
set up in Oklahoma City after the bombing, with several experts answering all
the questions that arise.
Regardless of how information is disseminated,
the message must be carefully considered. If the flulike symptoms of smallpox
are identified on the evening news, a flood of noninfected persons with stuffy
noses or headaches could swell emergency rooms across the state. Other reports,
such as upcoming quarantine efforts, may also spread panic and should be handled
carefully. The types of stories the media choose to write present a challenge.
The press will not only cover the crisis but the managers of the crisis. Plans
for responding to questions about crisis management must be in place. Whether
or not the message that goes out to the public includes mention of terrorism should
The hospital infections expert pursues a different angle
to the issue of information exchange. The difficulties in interviewing the public
have not been solved, she points out. Who will do the interviews? How they will
be coordinated with criminal investigations? Who will receive vaccine? And how
will health-care workers be protected? Will the system be overwhelmed by false
casespeople who think they have smallpox? Moreover, a basic problem in the early
days of the epidemic is the need for an infrastructure to handle the large volume
of calls flooding the hospitals.
What will be the plan of action? Hundreds of
people will have to be mobilized to interview the public, and hundreds more will
be needed to administer vaccine. The distribution of antibiotics and vaccines
represents a logistical problem that must be overcome.
As the epidemic
grows and spreads to several states, friction between the levels of government
grows. Governors are demanding vaccine supplies, fueling a larger debate of how
vaccination should be handled. Tens of thousands of people are vaccinated, but
many more still need vaccine. Media reports begin to be critical of the government's
handling of the crisis.
What still needs to be done? With a growing
number of deaths, the rise in the number of patients in quarantine, the loss of
critical health-care workers and city emergency workers, within the city things
are beginning to get out of focus, notes a city official. Asking how leadership
will function inside the hospital, the hospital epidemiologist identifies a need
for official responses that are well thought out, strong, and based on hard science.
The vaccine campaign poses significant issues. The limited supply
of vaccine must be divided up and distributed according to greatest riskpersons
who may have been infected or who care for those infected, argues an official
in federal emergency management. Political leaders and essential city workers
are other priority groups. A consensus must be reached as to how to proceed with
the vaccinations. CDC is best suited to coordinate vaccine efforts, but the public
health community must work towards an emergency. The governor, warns the city
emergency manager, may step in and call the shots. There is a need for a public
health emergency plan. Did the outbreak start from a single source or from multiple
sources? This determination would help with vaccine management and allocation,
but there is no answer. Moreover, testing facilities at CDC and USAMRIID are overwhelmed
at this point in the epidemic.
Hospitals must deal with quarantine.
Restrictions are imposed in the first days or weeks of an epidemic. Workers' fear
of being sequestered causes them to leave hospitals understaffed. Many people
are likely to stay at their posts if they feel they have reliable information
and support, argues a mental health provider. Some, however, may leave the front
lines to go home to their own families.
According to a 1905 Massachusetts case, cites
a state's assistant attorney general, compulsory vaccinations are not a violation
of due process and are therefore legal. So the local, state, and federal levels
of government have no obstacle to vaccinating those designated at risk.
A more difficult legal question is that of quarantining smallpox patients. Many
of the public health codes used to allocate powers to government officials are
old and may not be valid or useful. Also, court precedents from HIV cases may
have heavily weighted matters in favor of due process. Minnesota, for example,
requires a separate court hearing for each case of quarantine. Thus, quarantine
may be possible in a hospital but not in the community.
Boston Beat a Smallpox Epidemic
Boston Globe (www.boston.com/globe) (02/02/01)
P. A3; Saltus, Richard.
Institutes of Health study, published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
suggests that the escalating rate of infectious disease can be combated if communities
emulate some of the practices Boston used to defeat a smallpox epidemic in 1901.
All Bostonians infected with smallpox were quarantined in designated facilities,
while teams of police officers and doctors vaccinated all healthy people. The
reason the effort was so successful was because "virus squads" went as far as
inoculating homeless people against their will. The researchers recommend that
initiatives be made to reach people with the highest probability of being disease
carriers without trampling on individual rights.
without vaccine, and without the will to quarantine, we are dead as a nation from
the second the vials of smallpox are dropped from the top of Empire State Building.
Epidemiologically speaking, the USA, and the rest of the world for that matter,
is a virgin for smallpox. There are NO people, world wide, under the age of 30,
who have smallpox immunity. Smallpox vaccination is effective for about ten years.
The last vaccination was given in 1973 in Bangladesh and Ethiopia.
American people virtually do not remember what the word "quarantine"
means. Jerry Brown refused to spray the crops in California for the Med Fly in
about 1980 because the idiot didn't want to spray his space cadet voting constituency
who were rabid greens. The Med Fly infestation got so bad that it was virtually
out of control. Jerry Brown was told to kiss $3 billion of agri-trade goodbye
if he waited to spray. Brown then over-reacted and sprayed everything in California.
This is how our Liberals and Bushites will respond to the need to quarantine.
Once they realize America is doomed and collapsing, they will herd millions of
people into concentration camp facilities to protect the uninfected.
day smallpox is found in the USA, mark it down-- Fully one third of the US population
will be wiped out. This will mean total collapse of life as we know it today,
and the US will go into total economic collapse. The only precautions will be
those you took BEFORE the epidemic. What are the chances of an epidemic? Well,
tell me, what are the chances of a mail bomber? What are the chances of a kook
blowing up the Federal Building in Oklahoma City? What are the chances of a Charles
Manson? What are the chances of a Vietnam Vet machine gunning a McDonalds? Now,
we move on to Libya, Iraq, Osama Bin Laden, Hamas, Hizb'ullah, North Korea, Fidel
Castro. Then, we move on to the potential of aging bio warfare bunkers in Russia
simply popping open from old age.
lastly, we have to ask, "Do we believe the World Health Organization, which
was managed by a former SS officer during the vaccination program, is believable
when they claim smallpox is eradicated?" I do not believe they are God, and
I do not believe the virus is 100% gone.
basic legal question is whether the lines of legal support are clear to all officials,
such as hospital guards and police officers. How far can police go to detain quarantined
patients? The limits of emergency powers should be clearly delineated in any predisaster
The epidemic is threatening to expand beyond the city into
the rest of the country and even beyond. The World Health Organization (WHO) will
probably become involved, and travel notifications have to be introduced.
Even without adequate supplies of vaccine, much can be done with the existing
stocks. Prevaccinating some health-care workers is a proactive approach. Having
a sizable pool of prevaccinated professionals who can mobilize and act as emergency
responders takes much of the pressure off local hospitals. One way to reduce secondary
transmission (outside of vaccinating the contacts of the infected person), instructs
the hospital epidemiologist, is good infection controlwearing filter masks and
washing hands well. Another way of controlling the epidemic is through quarantine.
While these measures are not a substitute for adequate vaccine supply, they can
slow the epidemic.
One problem with the vaccine supply is that many
more people want to be vaccinated than limited stores permit. There are not even
enough stores of vaccine to prevent the spread of the epidemic. The existing 6
to 7 million doses of smallpox vaccine will not last forever, and the 36 months
it takes for additional large-scale preparations is prohibitive, argues a vaccine
campaign expert. Health officials will likely not have the time or resources to
target precisely those people who have an actual need for vaccine. The need for
vaccine will overwhelm the supply.
The cost of vaccine development
may inhibit stockpiling, proposes a CDC official. Since an attack with smallpox
is of low probability, large-scale production may be difficult to justify. A partnership
between private industry and the government would help, however. Also, the cost
of getting caught without an adequate supply could be disastrous.
Possible emergency measures to stretch the vaccine supply, proposes a smallpox
expert, include arm-to-arm vaccination as pustules form on the arms of vaccinated
people; vaccinia could be grown in massive amounts in tissue culture; and 30 million
doses of vaccine could be contracted from South Africa.
The smallpox epidemic has become a major public
health emergency affecting several cities in many states and at least four other
countries. The event is identified as a terrorist attack, because no other source
of smallpox outside a deliberate release exists. For those who have already contracted
smallpox, antiviral drugs, such as cydolfivir, may be useful but these medicines
may be just as scarce as the vaccines.
Secondary transmission got
out of hand, vaccine use did not contain the epidemic, and standard planning did
not work. Thus a state health official sums up the deficiencies of response. Hospital
resources have been overwhelmed, with people flooding emergency rooms in the belief
they have smallpox. These cases are added to hospitalized cases before and during
the epidemic; yet there are not even enough beds for all the sick. The hospital
staff have become physically and emotionally exhausted from the long hours and
from seeing about a third of infected patients die.
Failure of containment
has turned the outbreak from local to national and international. However, the
epidemic would have been much worse, had it gone unchecked, notes a state health
official. Containment was significant. The 15,000 smallpox cases could have easily
been more than 100,000.
No perpetrators have yet been identified,
despite combining the criminal and the epidemiologic investigations. Such methodical
work, however, is important because, unless the intelligence community comes up
with information or a tip, there is no other way to identify the source of the
epidemic, explains an FBI offical.
Many of the problems in the epidemic
could have been avoided or controlled if extensive plans had existed, panelists
agree. The panelist speaking from a governor's perspective identifies leadership
as the most pressing void. Should the city have been placed under immediate quarantine?
Should martial law have been implemented? Is the designation of a single smallpox
hospital a reasonable thing for any city to do? These are difficult questions
to face in the wake of a disaster. Such issues must be addressed long before trouble
Who Will Pay
for the Smallpox Epidemic?
The significant cost of curtailing
the epidemic is debated. How will a smallpox hospital be financed, inquires a
physician. The money might come from the federal government as emergency management
funding, suggests a city emergency manager. The infrastructure and linkages within
the public health community could be improved, the capacity for laboratory testing
of samples could be increased, surveillance methods could be enhanced, and a health
information strategy could be developed.
While the smallpox scenario
is certainly frightening, experience with earlier epidemics (smallpox among them),
knowledge of the issues, and expertise to deal with them show that in a crisis
people from all disciplines pull together.
Mr. Bardi is a freelance writer in Baltimore who holds degrees
in biophysics and science writing from Johns Hopkins University.
Johns Hopkins University,
for Civilian Biodefense Studies,
111 Market Place, Ste. 850,
MD 21202, USA;
shall we do?
to find work which allows you to earn a living without interacting with people.
Find a home in the country NOW, not later, for millions will be heading for the
Arm yourself. Have firearms and sprays, such as ammonia. Guns may
be outlawed. Think!
Learn any ploys you can use to get the vaccine unofficially.
Can you get it in Mexico?
Be prepared to move to a part of the country where
there is no epidemic.
Learn defensive measures now and how you will employment
Shop in the middle of the night. Use mail order for everything you can
Spray yourself and virtually everything you bring into your home with
Use alcohol hand cleaners when outside the home.
Keep a supply
of face masks and latex gloves on hand.
you are shy about using precautions in public, you better go make arrangement
at the local mortuary NOW. They will be rather busy later, and you could end up
being dumped in a ditch for the coyotes to eat.
shaking hands with people.
Do not attend public functions for any reason.
Do not attend a church which has no quarantine measure in place.
in a supply of food.
Get a supply of water ahead.
Buy a second freezer
and keep it full.
Plant a garden.
Do NOT buy vegies imported from anywhere.
Do not allow your pets to roam the neighborhood.
Home school your children
(this may actually be forced on you by local officials, so get on with it).
Never eat out.
Don't stay in Motels.
Drive to destinations-- never use
the airlines-- they do NOT filter the air in that plane.
As a family, sit
down protocols for defending yourself.
Ask yourselves, "What will we
do if someone in the family gets smallpox?"
all the smallpox now stocked in the world (20 tons in Russia alone), and given
the millions of pathological people on this earth, you can count on it-- there
WILL be a smallpox epidemic. You cannot hope for a solution by computer geeks,
as we were rescued from Y2K peril. There is NO way to stop evil men from unleashing
this epidemic, and they need to do so before about 2005, for by then, most of
the White Race, who own all the debt on earth, will have restocked vaccines.
imagine all the nations today, hopelessly in eternal debt to the World Bank, who
would be liberated by the collapse of the USA and Europe! What a motivation for
about 90 national leaders to drop the vial.
OCTOBER 15, 2001
..........Dr. Osterholm last year wrote an
excellent book entitled "Living Terrors: What America Needs to Know to Survive
the Coming Bioterrorist Catastrophe." (Delacorte Press 2000) I strongly recommend
this concise but important book.
"Smallpox, the nightmare to end all
nightmares that was eliminated as a natural disease in the 1970s, often starts
with a simple fever -- the sort of thing anyone might get," Dr. Osterholm writes
in the book. After a relatively long incubation period, it gets worse.
When I interviewed him Sunday, he pointed out that smallpox does kill about 30
percent of the people that contract it. In the United States today, he said, mostly
everyone would be susceptible to smallpox since few people have received vaccinations
since the 1970s. If you did receive a vaccination 30 years ago, it probably is
no longer effective. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says: "Routine
vaccination against smallpox ended in 1972. The level of immunity, if any, among
persons who were vaccinated before 1972 is uncertain; therefore, these persons
are assumed to be susceptible." The CDC has an informative site on small pox.
here, to view it.
Unlike anthrax, smallpox can be transmitted
by people who have contracted it. "So instead of having that first event be the
end of it, like it is with anthrax where no one who becomes infected transmits
this on, smallpox could be transmitted on," Dr. Osterholm told me.
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, a former law enforcement official who participated
in the "Dark Winter" war game on bio-terrorism, is also an authority on the subject.
He told me local and state health officials quickly need lots more training to
deal with the threat of smallpox. He says the supply of vaccine needs to be increased
"Don't let an individual in Washington say that doctors
and nurses, for example, in Atlanta can't have them, they have to go some place
else," Keating says. "We have to have a decision-making mechanism that's prompt."
Let's hope the threat of smallpox remains simply that -- a threat.
YOU CAN READ WHAT CHANCE YOU HAVE
BEING VACCINATED DURING AN EPIDEMIC
EXAMPLE OF THE NEW AGE HEALTH NUTS TAKING CREDIT FOR
OF SMALLPOX BY THE OTHER BRANCH OF THE NEW AGE.
This shows how well you can
trust these people to tell you the truth.
HAS INDEED BEEN USED IN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE..................
BY THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AGAINST AMERICAN INDIANS
ON AMERICAN INDIAN MASSACRE BY WHITE RACE
SMALLPOX ATTACKS A VIRGIN CULTURE, LIKE OURS TODAY
The viruses that make us: a role
for endogenous retrovirus
in the evolution of placental species
The view that viruses are principally major
agents of disease is richly deserved. In human history, viral epidemics have accounted
for more human deaths than all known wars and famine combined. This especially
evident in the new world following the introduction of smallpox, then measles,
influenza, and mumps into the then naive native american population from Europe.
In Europe, these disease had already established a childhood pattern of infection.
Essentially all adult Europeans were literally the survivors of childhood infections
with smallpox and measles.
Smallpox was particularly significant
in New World demographics. The first epidemic on the mainland was to hit the Aztec
population around the time of the infamous ‘noche triste’ on June 20th 1520, killing
all the leaders and many warriors of the Aztec revolt that expelled Cortez. This
revolt, one that killed many of Cortez’s conquistadors and drove them from Tinochtitlan
(the Aztec capital), was to ultimately fail in spite of the seemingly enormous
numerical advantage of the Aztecs. This smallpox epidemic and resulting social
chaos was to deliver a death blow to this numeric superiority and clear the way
for the successful return Cortez and his allies the following year.
and subsequent epidemics were to continue their inexorable march through the Inca
and Mayan civilizations then later into the North and South American continents,
including Indians from the Mississippi valley, the Eastern seaboard, then into
California and the Columbia river valley resulting in the greatest demographic
catastrophe in human history.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE WHICH IGNORES BIO-WARFARE
IS HOW ONE VIRUS CAME TO AMERICA TO STAY
* * * * *
REST OF THE ARTICLES IN THIS SERIES:
DURING ATTACKS AND PANIC
COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF PANIC AND BIO ATTACKS RESPONSE
DISCUSSION OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND THE USE OF TOXINS
AS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND ITS CURE
AS BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND ITS CURE
TERRORIST ATTACK AND HOW TO PREVENT AND CURE IT
NO CURE-- Prelude to Armageddon
THE TITLE PAGE OF THE PIANO SITE